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The author examines private access to the Competition Tribunal under
section 103.1 of the Competition Act. After considering the proceedings of
private parties that have taken place before the Tribunal, he analyzes the
requirements that must be met in order to have access and the remedies
available. Assessing these from a policy perspective, the author suggests
two revisions to the Competition Act: lowering the standing requirement
for individuals from having their businesses be “directly and substantially”
affected to merely having their businesses be “directly and materially”
affected, and expanding section 103.1 to include the possibility of bringing
applications for reviewable practices falling under section 79.
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INTRODUCTION
In contrast with the experience of many other jurisdictions, including
the United States,1 the enforcement of competition laws in Canada
has historically been undertaken by governmental bodies. Prior to
1976, individuals in Canada had no standing before courts to enforce
competition laws or to seek damages for breaches of competition laws.
Legislative amendments introduced in 1976—and continued in section 36
of the current Competition Act—provided individuals with the right to sue
for damages for losses caused by certain types of anti-competitive conduct,
the most important of these being conspiracies.2 Section 36 has seen
significant use, especially since the introduction of class action legislation,
and class actions dealing with anti-competitive conspiracies are now
increasingly being litigated in Canadian courts.3 However, the enforcement
of many important provisions of the Competition Act, including the
provisions outlined in Part VII prohibiting restrictive trade practices,
remained exclusively in the hands of Competition Bureau.
Following a flurry of debate over allowing private enforcement,4 this
situation changed in 2002 with the passage of amendments to the
Competition Act, which gave private parties the ability to access the
Competition Tribunal to challenge certain restrictive trade practices
1 B.A. Facey & D.H. Assaf, Competition and Antitrust Law: Canada and the United States,
3rd ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2006) at 489-90 [Facey & Assaf].
2 Competition Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-34, s. 36 [Competition Act]. Legislative amendments
in 1976 provided individuals with the right under what is now section 36 of the Competition
Act to recover damages for losses suffered in certain cases, but private actions under this
section were limited by both a) the limitations on the type of offences for which parties
could recover damages and b) the inability of parties to seek injunctive relief to prevent the
wrong from occurring. See; also Michael Trebilcock, Ralph Winter, Paul Collins & Edward
Iacobucci, The Law and Economics of Canadian Competition Policy (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2003) at 765-75 [Trebilcock et al.].
3 The legal and policy considerations relating to competition class actions in Canada have
been explored elsewhere at length. See, e.g., Vol. 3, No. 1, of The Canadian Class Action
Review, which was devoted exclusively to issues surrounding competition class actions.
4 See, inter alia, N. Finkelstein & J. Quinn, “Reevaluating the Role of Private Enforcement
and Private Party Access to the Competition Tribunal” (Paper presented at the University
of Toronto Faculty of Law, 8 December 1995) [unpublished]; Trebilcock & Roach, infra
note 7; Roach & Trebilcock Article, infra note 60; Rowley & Campbell, infra note 8.
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in limited circumstances.5 While these changes represented in some
ways a substantial break with the traditional model of competition law
enforcement in Canada, little academic attention has been paid to them
since their introduction.6 This article will seek to fill this gap by discussing
two interrelated issues which have remained largely unaddressed. First,
this article will provide a comprehensive overview of the legal framework
for private party access. Second, this article will critically assess that legal
framework by exploring why private party access is permitted under the
Competition Act and whether the current framework optimally furthers the
policy objectives of allowing private party access.
It is important to note that this article does not purport to provide
a comprehensive theoretical analysis of the private enforcement of
competition laws; nor does it attempt to provide an international
comparative study of the framework governing private enforcement of
competition laws; nor does it analyze in detail the substantive provisions
in the Competition Act that are now enforceable by private litigants. While
these are worthwhile research programs, these issues have already been
examined elsewhere.7 This paper will not avoid these topics entirely, but it
will only engage with them to the extent necessary to effectively analyze
the current provisions. Instead, this paper focuses directly on the Canadian
provisions governing private access in order to highlight the current state
of the law and assess whether the law actually furthers the policy goals of
the Competition Act.
This paper will proceed as follows: Part I provides a brief overview of the
private proceedings which have taken place before the Tribunal; Part II
5 An Act to Amend the Competition Act, S.C. 2002, c. 16.
6 A cursory overview of the provision and some of the cases is available in John Callaghan,
Ian MacDonald & Blair McKechnie, “What about the flood of litigation?”, online: (2005)
Gowlings Lafleur Henderson LLP <http://www.gowlings.com/resources/PDFs/What%20
about%20the%20flood%20of%20litigation.pdf>.
7 See Kent Roach & Michael Trebilcock, “Private Party Access to the Competition
Tribunal” (Hull, Que.: 7 May 1996) [Trebilcock & Roach]; R. Jack Roberts, “International
Comparative Analysis of Private Rights of Access (A Study Commissioned by Industry
Canada; Competition Bureau)”, online: (1999) <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSI/ct/roberts-e.
pdf>; see also Trebilcock et al., supra note 2 at Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 12.
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examines the law of private party access to the Competition Tribunal,
both outlining the thresholds that parties must meet in order to obtain
access and examining the remedies available to parties; Part III proceeds
to assess whether the current legal framework of private party access is
effective from a policy standpoint, and it argues that certain changes to the
Competition Act would better serve the underlying policy goals of private
party access; and Part IV serves as a brief conclusion.

I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PRIVATE PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL

Prior to the amendments which enabled private parties to access the
Tribunal, some commentators argued that allowing private access would
have disastrous consequences. Rowley and Campbell predicted, inter alia,
that procedural safeguards would not prevent the flood of unmeritorious
litigation and that the high costs relating to private actions would have
an overall negative effect on the Canadian economy.8 Six years after
the introduction of private party access, one can conclude that their
predictions were incorrect. Between the coming into force of these
provisions in 2002 and December 2008, the Tribunal has considered
nineteen applications for leave to make an application under sections 75 or
77.9 Of these nineteen applications, thirteen were dismissed and six were
allowed. Of the six which were allowed, only one application has ultimately
been adjudicated on its merits, where it failed, and a full hearing on one
other is currently pending. Of the four which were allowed but never heard
on their merits, settlements were achieved between the parties in two of
8 J. William Rowley & Neil Campbell, “Private Litigation Over Reviewable Practices: A
Cost-Benefit Analysis” in Should Reviewable Practices be Turned into Competition Torts? (A
Report prepared for the Competition Policy Group, October 2001) 21 at 117-166 [Rowley
& Campbell].
9 	

    Another	

    application	

    was	

    ﬁled	

    in	

    2007	

    by	

    London	

    Drugs,	

    but	

    it	

    was	

    withdrawn	

    before	

    the	

    
Tribunal considered it; see Competition Tribunal, online: (2007) <http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/
CMFiles/CT-2007-002_0029_53PVI-582007-1463.pdf>.
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the cases, one application was withdrawn, and in one leave was rescinded
under section 106.10
These figures, if taken alone, suggest mixed results from the Canadian
experiment with private access. The anticipated flood of frivolous
claims has not materialized, and with the possible exception of the two
cases in which settlements were reached, private applications have not
generally been successful, with the majority (68%) failing at the initial
stage of seeking leave to bring an application.11 This lack of success by
private applicants at the initial stage could indicate either that the claims
were genuinely unmeritorious or that the rules governing private access
prevented genuinely meritorious claims from being heard. The following
sections address precisely this question by outlining and critically assessing
the law of private access.

II. THE LAW OF PRIVATE ACCESS TO THE
COMPETITION TRIBUNAL

This Part explores the statutory provisions and case law surrounding
private access to the Competition Tribunal. It begins with an extended
examination of the conditions which an applicant must satisfy in order
to	

    be	

    granted	

    leave.	

    It	

    then	

    brieﬂy	

    examines	

    the	

    remedies	

    available	

    to	

    
applicants.

10 Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 106.
11 Of course, there may be other measures of success than simply success by private
applicants at the Tribunal. The increased possibility of a company being subject to an
application under section 103(1) may have resulted in increased deterrence of reviewable
practices which thus could not be the subject of any application, though this obviously
cannot be properly assessed.
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A. Obtaining Leave to Make an Application
The starting point of an analysis of private access is its governing
provisions. The foundational provision governing access to the
Competition Tribunal is section 103.1(1), which, at the time of writing
states:
(1) Any person may apply to the Tribunal for leave to make
an application under section 75 or 77. The application for
leave must be accompanied by an affidavit setting out the
facts in support of the person’s application under section
75 or 77.12
There are three important aspects of this provision. First, there is no
automatic right of access to the Tribunal; rather, a person must apply for
leave. The conditions for obtaining leave are discussed in greater detail
immediately below. Second, under the language of section 103.1 as it has
stood from its introduction in 2002, an application can only be made
under section 75 (refusal to deal) or 77 (exclusive dealing, tied selling, and
market restriction), though amendments to the Competition Act included
in Bill C-10 at the time of writing would allow applications to be made
under an amended section 76 (price maintenance).13 Third, the application
is undertaken primarily on the basis of affidavit evidence. The application
is to be judged summarily, primarily on the basis of affidavit evidence from
both parties and without an oral hearing.14
12 Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 103.1(1). Bill C-10, the 2009 budget implementation
bill, substantially amends the Competition Act. For the purposes of this paper, the most
important modification is the amendment of section 103.1 of the Act to include an amended
section 76 along with sections 75 and 77 as the provisions under which a person may seek
leave to make an application. The amended section 76 introduces price maintenance as a
reviewable practice. This change, coupled with the repeal of section 61 of the Competition
Act, converts price maintenance from a criminal offence to a civil reviewable practice. Bill
C-10, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on January
27, 2009 and related fiscal measures, 2nd Sess., 40th Parl., 2009 [Bill C-10].
13 Bill C-10, ibid.
14 Barcode Systems Inc. v. Symbol Technologies Canada ULC, 2004 FCA 339, [2004]
F.C.J. No. 1657 at para. 24 [Barcode (FCA)]. Section 103.1(6) permits the party served
by an application to respond to the application with written representations. The applicant
may	

    also	

    be	

    allowed	

    to	

    ﬁle	

    a	

    reply	

    to	

    the	

    respondent’s	

    response.	

    See	

    Nadeau Poultry Farm
Limited v. Groupe Westco Inc. et al., 2008 Comp. Trib. 6.
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Various subsections govern the requirements for obtaining leave. Section
103.1(4) prohibits the Tribunal from considering an application for leave
where the matter with respect to which leave is sought is the subject of
an inquiry by the Commissioner, was the subject of an inquiry by the
Commissioner which was discontinued because of a settlement, or has
already been brought before the Tribunal by the Commissioner.15 Section
103.1(8) specifies that leave cannot be obtained where the matter which is
the subject of the application ceased more than one year prior.16
Beyond the above requirements, the general provision governing the
granting of leave is section 103.1(7), which states:
The Tribunal may grant leave to make an application
under section 75 or 77 if it has reason to believe that
the applicant is directly and substantially affected in the
applicants’ business by any practice referred to in one of
those sections that could be subject to an order under that
section.17
In the subsequent jurisprudence, the Tribunal has parsed this provision
into two distinct elements: “(1) the applicant is directly and substantially
affected in the applicant’s business by any practice referred to in section 75
15 Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 103.1(3), (4). In order to enable the Tribunal to more
easily decide this question, section 103.1(3) requires the Commissioner to certify within 48
hours of receiving a copy of the application for leave whether or not the matter which forms
the subject of the application fits either of these conditions. Ibid. at s. 103.1(3).
16 Ibid., s. 103.1(8).
17 Ibid., s. 103.1(7). Under Bill C-10, the standard that would be applicable for granting
leave for applications under section 76 of the Competition Act is not the standard outlined
in section 103.1(7). Rather, Bill C-10 introduces a new section, section 103.1(7.1), which
creates a modified standard which is solely applicable to granting leave for applications
under section 76. This provision reads as follows: “The Tribunal may grant leave to make an
application under section 76 if it has reason to believe that the applicant is directly affected
by any conduct referred to in that section that could be subject to an order under that
section.” Bill C-10, supra note 12, s. 431(4). While similar in many ways to the standard in
the current section 103.1(7), the standard in the proposed section 103.1(7.1) differs in two
respects. First, it removes any reference to an applicant’s business, thereby broadening the
class of persons who can bring applications. Second, it only requires that an individual be
“directly affected” rather than “directly and substantially affected,” as is the requirement in
section 103.1(7).
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or 77 of the Act; and (2) the alleged practice could be subject to an order
under that section”.18 The following sections thus first examine the content
of these two requirements, before moving on to the required standard of
proof.

1. “Directly and substantially affected” – The Standing Requirement
The first of the two requirements which the applicant must fulfill is to
demonstrate that “the applicant is directly and substantially affected in the
applicant’s business by any practice referred to in section 75 or 77 of the
Act.”19 This requirement has been exceptionally important in applications
under section 103.1. Indeed, in the vast majority of decisions where
leave was refused, the reason for refusal was that the applicant did not
demonstrate that his business was “directly and substantially affected.”
It is also important to note that this requirement is effectively a test for
standing. In order to be able to bring an application, an individual’s
business must be directly and substantially affected by the impugned
conduct; this implies that neither unaffected businesses nor consumers
have standing to bring an application under section 103.1(7).20 Indeed, this
interpretation of the purpose of this provision has been confirmed by the
Federal Court of Appeal.21

18 National Capital News Canada v. Milliken, 2002 Comp. Trib. 41, at para. 8. [National
Capital News].
19 Ibid.
20 The rigidity of this requirement is demonstrated by the Competition Tribunal’s decision
in Canadian Standard Travel Agency Registry v. International Air Transport Association,
2008 Comp. Trib. 14, in which it held that a trade association representing a large number of
allegedly affected businesses did not having standing to bring an application, as the applicant
itself was not affected. From a comparative perspective, the class of parties who can obtain
standing in Canada under section 103 of the Competition Act is significantly more limited
than the class of litigants in the United States that have antitrust standing under American
antitrust statutes. For useful discussions of some of the contours of antitrust standing in
the United States, see Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters et al., 459 U.S. 519 (1983); Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 505 F.3d 302
(4th Cir. 2007).
21 Barcode (FCA), supra note 14 at para. 22.
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In terms of the substance of what this provision requires, there has thus far
not been any judicial consideration of the requirement that the business
be “directly” affected. While the Tribunal has not yet had any reason to
address this directness requirement, this language likely has the effect of
denying standing to a downstream business whose business suffered from
the anti-competitive practices taken against an upstream supplier. Thus,
if a retailer’s business is negatively impacted by a producer’s decision to
refuse to deal with a wholesaler who had been supplying that retailer,
the directness requirement likely limits standing to the directly affected
wholesaler rather than the indirectly affected retailer.22
In contrast to the lack of judicial interpretation of the directness
requirement, the question of when a business has been “substantially
affected” has been explored at length by the Competition Tribunal. The
threshold for what has been considered “substantial” by the Tribunal has
been quite high. Noting the similarity in wording between section 75(1)
(a) and section 103.1(7), the Tribunal has effectively taken “substantial”
to mean the same thing in the context of section 103.1(7) as it does in
section 75(1)(a).23 Under section 75(1)(a), “substantially affected” has been
interpreted to require an examination of whether the business as a whole
has been substantially affected rather than simply examining whether a
particular product or product line of that business has been affected,24 and
this interpretation has been adopted into the meaning of substantial in
section 103.1(7). Thus, in Broadview Pharmacy v. Wyeth Canada Inc., the
Tribunal did not find a direct and substantial effect because the product
which was the subject of the application only constituted 5% of the
applicant’s sales of pharmaceuticals.25 Similarly, in Construx Engineering
Corporation v. General Motors of Canada, evidence that a line of vehicles
which was the subject of an alleged refusal to deal constituted 67% of the
applicant’s sales of new motor vehicles was not considered to be sufficient
22 This limitation is thus likely analogous to the limitation on recovery by indirect
purchasers in American conspiracy class actions. For the classic case on this point, see
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
23 Competition Act, supra note 2, ss. 75, 103.1.
24 Chrysler Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Competition Tribunal) (1989), 1989 Carswell Nat 720,
27 C.P.R. (3d) 1, [1989] C.C.T.D. No.49, at 29-31.
25 2004 Comp. Trib. 22. [Broadview].
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evidence of a company’s business being substantially affected, since
there was no indication what percentage of the company’s total sales this
represented.26 Even more striking in this regard is the Tribunal’s decision
in Sears Canada Inc. v. Parfums Christian Dior Canada Inc. and Parfums
Givenchy Canada Ltd, where a loss of $16 million was not considered a
substantial impact to Sears because “it [was] insignificant in the context of
Sears’ $6 billion business overall”.27
By contrast, cases where the Tribunal has found evidence of a substantial
impact have been those where the business of the applicant has been
virtually ruined by the impugned conduct. In B-Filer Inc. v. The Bank of
Nova Scotia, the Tribunal found that the loss of 50% of the applicant’s
revenue constituted a substantial impact.28 In Robinson Motorcycle Limited.
v. Fred Deeley Imports Ltd., an applicant’s business was substantially
affected because it relied exclusively on the products which the respondent
refused to supply.29 In Barcode Systems Inc. v. Symbol Technologies Canada
ULC, the alleged refusal to deal forced the company into receivership and
caused it to lay off half of its workforce.30 Thus, although there are not
enough cases to make a definitive statement, it seems that the threshold of
what constitutes a substantial impact is a high one.

2. “That could be the subject of an order” – Establishing the
Elements of the Practice
The second requirement for being granted leave to make an application
is that “the alleged practice could be subject to an order under that
section.” The initial interpretation of this section was muddled. In the
first application under section 103.1, the applicant sought an order to
compel the Speaker of Parliament to give him access to the parliamentary
press gallery, alleging that the Speaker’s failure to do so constituted
26
27
28
29
30

2005 Comp. Trib. 21 [Construx].
2007 Comp. Trib. 6, at para. 33 [Sears].
2005 Comp. Trib. 38 [B-Filer (2005)].
2005 Comp. Trib, 52, at para. 8 [Robinson].
2004 Comp. Trib. 1, para. 16-17 [Barcode (CT)].
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a refusal to deal. The Tribunal disposed of this matter by concluding
that parliamentary privilege gave the Speaker of the House the right to
refuse access to Parliament to individuals and that the Tribunal had no
jurisdiction to consider this privilege; the Tribunal did not discuss what, if
anything, an applicant was required to demonstrate under this part of the
provision.31 In Barcode (CT), the second application to the Tribunal under
section 103.1, the Tribunal removed this evidentiary burden altogether.
The Tribunal ruled that in order to be granted leave to make an application
to the Tribunal, applicants only had to demonstrate that their business was
directly and substantially affected; in this case, the applicant did not have
to provide any evidence of all of the statutory elements of the impugned
practice.32
On appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, the Competition Tribunal’s
conclusion on this point was reversed. The Court of Appeal concluded that
in an application for leave, “there must be some evidence by the applicant
and some consideration by the Tribunal” of all elements of the reviewable
practice which is the subject of the application for leave.33 This has
remained the appropriate standard which has been applied by the Tribunal
since Barcode (FCA).
To summarize, the current interpretation of section 103.1(7) requires
that in order to be granted leave to make an application, applicants must
adduce evidence of two things. First, they must establish that their business
was directly and substantially affected by the conduct of the respondent.
Second, applicants must give some evidence that the respondent’s practice
met all the statutory elements of reviewable practice with respect to which
they are seeking leave.

31 National Capital News, supra note 18.
32 Barcode (CT), supra note 30 at para. 8.
33 Barcode (FCA), supra note 14.
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3. “Reason to believe” – The Evidentiary Threshold
Having examined the elements which an applicant must demonstrate in
an application for leave, it is also necessary to consider the question of
the extent to which parties must demonstrate those elements.34 Section
103.1(7) does not require that a claim be established on the balance of
probabilities, but rather specifies that the Tribunal must have “reason
to believe” that the elements could be made out.35 The exact content of
this standard has fluctuated somewhat. The initial test employed by the
Tribunal in National Capital News was that the application would have
to be “supported by sufficient credible evidence to give rise to a bona
fide belief ” that the elements of section 103.1(7) could be made out.36
In Barcode (CT), the Tribunal held that this standard amounted to “less
than a balance of probabilities” but more than a “mere possibility”.37 Some
decisions have been decided simply on whether the Tribunal “could
conclude” that the elements were made out,38 a standard which necessarily
seems to conflict with the fact that a mere possibility is not sufficient.
Thankfully, most of the case law has applied the initial test formulated in
National Capital News.
While the test to be employed has been fairly constant throughout the case
law, the application of that test in determining what constitutes “sufficient
evidence” has varied. In some cases, a relatively low requirement has been
implemented, with the Tribunal accepting affidavit evidence and limited
financial statements as sufficient credible evidence that the applicant’s
business would be directly and substantially harmed.39 By contrast, where
34 Obviously, the burden of proof must be lower than a balance of probabilities, since such
a high standard would negate many of the benefits of an initial application stage. Moreover,
it would be unreasonable to require a demonstration of the elements on an overly onerous
standard simply on the presentation of affidavit evidence.
35 Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 103.1(7).
36 National Capital News, supra note 18 at para. 14; approved of by the Federal Court of
Appeal in Barcode, see Barcode (FCA), supra note 14 at para. 19; applied in B-Filer (2005),
supra note 28 at para. 52.
37 Barcode (CT), supra note 30 at paras. 12-13.
38 Robinson, supra note 29; Quinlan’s of Huntsville Inc. v. Fred Deeley Imports Ltd., 2004
Comp. Trib. 15 [Quinlan].
39 Allan Morgan and Sons Ltd. v. La-2-Boy Canada Ltd., 2004 Comp. Trib. 4 [Allan
Morgan]. Note, however, that precise data is not required for every element. In Barcode, the
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no financial statements were given, the Tribunal has refused leave, stating
that it would not rely on mere speculation;40 similarly, where financial
information was provided in an affidavit but the basis or manner of
calculation of that information has not been provided, leave has been
refused.41 While these decisions seem reasonable, the more difficult ones
to understand are those where some financial evidence has been adduced
in support of the applicant’s contention, but the Tribunal has rejected
the evidence as being insufficient, as occurred in Construx.42 These cases
provide only minimal indication in terms of what the courts will accept
as sufficient evidence, and the practical meaning of the test in National
Capital News is somewhat ambiguous. All that can be said is that while
the courts will certainly require some concrete evidence in support of
the application, the amount of evidence which is required to constitute
“sufficient credible evidence” is unclear.
One final evidentiary point which is worth noting is the impact of section
103.1(11). This section specifies that “in considering an application for
leave, the Tribunal may not draw any inference from the fact that the
Commissioner has or has not taken any action in respect of the matter
raised by it”.43 While this provision has not been judicially considered,
its inclusion in the statute is nonetheless important. If the Tribunal
were allowed to draw inferences from the fact that the Competition
Commissioner had not taken action, a significant additional hurdle would
be placed in front of any potential applicants. Especially insofar as one of
the policy aims of section 103.1 is to allow private parties to bring valid
claims when the Bureau is for some reason unwilling or unable to do
so—an idea which is discussed further below—the absence of an explicit
provision such as section 103.1(11) might have the effect of completely
Federal Court of Appeal inferred that there could be a substantial lessening of competition
based on certain facts of the case rather than being provided any evidence directly thereof.
See Barcode (FCA), supra note 14.
40 Paradise Pharmacy Inc. and Rymal Pharmacy Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Canada
Inc., 2004 Comp. Trib. 21, at para. 23 [Paradise]. See also Annable v. Capital Sports and
Entertainment Inc. 2008 Comp. Trib. 5 [Annable].
41 Sono Pro Inc. v. Sonotechnique P.J.L. Inc., 2007 Comp. Trib. 18.
42 Construx, supra note 26.
43 Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 103.1(11).
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undercutting the policy aims of section 103.1(1).

B. Remedies
The remedy available to parties who successfully bring an application
under sections 75 or 77 is injunctive relief that prohibits the impugned
practice.44	

    In	

    addition	

    to	

    ﬁnal	

    injunctive	

    relief,	

    interlocutory	

    relief	

    is	

    also	

    
available.45 Section 104(1) authorizes the Tribunal to grant interlocutory
relief “having regard to the principles ordinarily considered by superior
courts when granting interlocutory or injunctive relief.”46 The Tribunal
has indicated that the governing test for interlocutory relief under
section 104(1) is that found in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney
General).47 Under this test, the applicant must establish:
1) that there is a serious issue to be tried; 48
2) that not granting relief will cause irreparable harm to
the applicant; and,
3) that the balance of convenience favours the grant of the
injunction.49

44 Ibid., ss. 75, 77.
45 Interim relief orders may be available even before leave to bring an application has
been granted. See Canadian Standard Travel Agency Registry v. International Air Transport
Association, 2008 Comp. Trib. 12.
46 Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 104.
47 [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 [RJR-MacDonald]; see B-Filer Inc. v. The Bank of Nova Scotia,
2005 Comp. Trib. 52 [B-Filer (Interim Relief Order)]; and Quinlan’s	

     of Huntsville Inc. v.
Fred Deeley Imports Ltd., 2004 Comp. Trib. 28 [Quinlan (Interim Relief Order)].
48 Interestingly, in Quinlan (Interim Relief Order), ibid., the Tribunal rejected the suggestion
that because the injunction sought was a mandatory interlocutory injunction, the standard
should be the higher “strong prima facie case” standard. This is in tension with other
mandatory interlocutory injunction cases which have employed a higher standard, though
not necessarily the “strong prima facie case” standard. For example, see Dempster v. Mutual
Life of Canada, [2000] I.L.R. I-3748, [1999] O.J. No. 3595 and the cases discussed therein;
see also Parker v. Canadian Tire Corp., [1998] O.J. No. 1720.
49 RJR-MacDonald, supra note 47.
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Although there have been few decisions which have considered
interlocutory relief under section 104(1), the few decided cases thus far
suggest that such injunctions will often be readily obtainable. The first
factor above will most likely be met if the applicant obtains leave under
section 103.1(7). With respect to the second requirement, the Tribunal
in Quinlan (Interim Relief Order) held that there was no duty on the part
of the applicant to mitigate by making alternative business arrangements
and that the loss of sales and goodwill could constitute irreparable harm.50
Finally, the Tribunal suggested that in a section 75 case, if the products are
in ample supply—evidence of which is itself a requirement for obtaining
leave—then the balance of convenience will favour the granting of an
injunction.51 Thus, this suggests that interlocutory relief will often be easily
available once the applicant has been granted leave.
In contrast to the United States, a successful applicant cannot recover any
damages. Section 103.1 has no provision for the awarding of damages; nor
do sections 75 or 77. Moreover, section 77(3.1) explicitly states that there
may be no award of damages under section 77 to an individual bringing an
application under section 103.1.52 While it is surprising that no analogous
provision was inserted into section 75, this does not suggest that damages
would be available under section 75 in an application under section 103.1,
since injunctive relief is the only remedy contemplated in section 75.

50 Quinlan (Interim Relief Order), supra note 47. Interestingly, in B-Filer (Interim Relief
Order), where interlocutory relief was refused, one of the reasons that no irreparable harm
was found by the court was that B-Filer had made alternative business arrangements; see
B-Filer (Interim Relief Order), supra note 47. Thus, it seems that there is no duty to mitigate,
but if the party does mitigate, it will be denied interlocutory relief. This could potentially
create a perverse incentive against mitigation.
51 Quinlan (Interim Relief Order), Ibid.
52 Competition Act, supra note 2 at s. 77.
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III. THE POLICY AIMS OF PRIVATE ACCESS
TO THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL

Having outlined the law on private access as it currently stands, this
section considers whether the law advances the policy aims of the
Competition Act.	

    To	

    this	

    end,	

    this	

    Part	

    ﬁrst	

    considers	

    what	

    the	

    policy	

    
goals are of allowing private party access to the Tribunal. It is important
to	

    clearly	

    deﬁne	

    these	

    policy	

    goals	

    prior	

    to	

    evaluating	

    the	

    effectiveness	

    or	

    
appropriateness of these particular provisions, because it is the realization
of the underlying purposes which is the standard by which the current
provisions must be measured. This Part then examines to what extent these
goals	

    are	

    adequately	

    reﬂected	

    in	

    the	

    current	

    legal	

    framework	

    by	

    critically	

    
examining a) the criteria for being granted leave to bring an application, b)
the remedies available to private litigants, and c) the substantive scope of
private party access.
In order to elucidate the rationale underlying private party access, it is
ﬁrst	

    necessary	

    to	

    remember	

    the	

    oft-stated	

    maxim	

    that	

    the	

    purpose	

    of	

    
competition law is to protect competition, not competitors. Indeed, from
an economic perspective, the harm of anti-competitive conduct is not
that it harms competitors. Rather, the harm of anti-competitive conduct
is the dead-weight social loss that occurs when markets are not operating
efﬁciently.53 Though for broader reasons rather than the more narrow
welfare	

    justiﬁcations	

    provided	

    by	

    economic	

    theory,	

    the	

    purpose	

    of	

    the	

    
Competition Act likewise seems to be the protection of competition. The
purpose clause in section 1.1 begins by stating that “the purpose of the Act
is to maintain and encourage competition in Canada,” and it then proceeds
to list a number of reasons why competition is protected.54 While there are
a number of goals fostered through the protection of competition—and
there	

    have	

    been	

    signiﬁcant	

    debates	

    over	

    how	

    to	

    balance	

    those	

    often-
53 Trebilcock et al., supra note 2 at 40. For an economic analysis of the harms
of monopolistic situations, see Chapter 1 of Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial
Organization (MIT Press, 1988).
54 Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 1.
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competing goals55—the overarching objective is to protect competition
itself rather than competitors.56	

    This	

    is	

    further	

    conﬁrmed	

    by	

    the	

    fact	

    
that the majority of the most important substantive provisions of the
Competition Act only proscribe conduct which harms competitors when
that conduct also has an anti-competitive effect, and not when it simply
has a harmful effect on a competitor.57
This conception of the purpose of competition law has particularly
important implications for the private enforcement of competition law. As
Rothstein JA wrote in Barcode (FCA) with respect to private party access:
the purpose of the Competition Act is to maintain and
encourage competition in Canada. It is not to provide a
statutory cause of action for the resolution of a dispute
between a supplier and a customer that has no bearing on
the maintenance or encouragement of competition.58
Thus, private party access is not justified on the basis that it can be used by
parties to rectify private wrongs, but on the basis that it is instrumentally
effective insofar as it serves the socially desirable end of promoting
competition.59
The theoretical strengths and weaknesses of permitting private
enforcement of law in favour of public ends are well-examined by
55 For the debate over how these goals are balanced, see Canada (Commissioner of
Competition) v. Superior Propane Inc., 2000 Comp. Trib. 15, 7 C.P.R. (4th) 385 at para.
404-413; Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Superior Propane Inc., 2001 FCA
104, 199 D.L.R. (4th) 130, 269 N.R. 109, [2001] 3 F.C. 185, 2001 CarswellNat 2092, 3
F.C. 185, 11 C.P.R. (4th) 289.
56 For an introductory discussion relating to the historical debate over the purpose
of competition law in Canada, see James Musgrove, “Introduction and Overview: The
Purpose of Canadian Competition Law” in James Musgrove, ed., Fundamentals of Canadian
Competition Law (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007) 1.
57 See, inter alia, Competition Act, supra note 2, ss. 45, 75, 77, 79, 92.
58 Barcode (FCA), supra note 14 at para. 23.
59 	

    Indeed,	

    Tribunal	

    decisions	

    support	

    this	

    justiﬁcation.	

    In	

    the	

    cost	

    order	

    resulting	

    from	

    
the litigation in Robinson v. Deeley cost order, para.31, the Tribunal wrote that “[p]rivate
Competition Act litigation is an important enforcement procedure of the Act.” See Robinson
Motorcycle Limited v. Fred Deeley Imports Ltd., 2005 Comp. Trib. 40.
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Trebilcock and Roach and bear reviewing here. On the one hand, there
are significant benefits which can flow from allowing private parties
to enforce public laws: private enforcement can supplement public
enforcement with additional resources, which is particularly important
if the public enforcer has limited resources; private enforcers may be in
a better position to detect breaches of the law; and private enforcement
is an efficient means of holding public enforcers accountable for their
decisions not to take action.60 These considerations certainly apply in
the competition context, as the Bureau is resource-constrained and
the cost of litigating complex competition cases can be high.61 Private
party access to the Tribunal can thus play an important role in relieving
the Competition Bureau of some of its responsibilities, rectifying any
perceived under-enforcement, and ensuring effective competition.
However, as Trebilcock and Roach note, there are also harms which
can result from private enforcement of the law: private enforcement
can result in over-deterrence; private enforcers can engage in strategic
enforcement or bring frivolous claims;62 and private enforcement can
undermine a coherent plan of public enforcement.63 Put broadly, this
implies that while private enforcers may play a useful role in achieving
a public end, because their incentives structure differs from that of a
public enforcer, allowing private enforcement of the law may also result
in certain societal harms. This suggests that private enforcement should
be allowed, but the rules which govern that private enforcement should
be structured in such a way as to attempt to bring private incentives
60 Kent Roach & Michael Trebilcock, “Private Enforcement of Competition Laws” (1996)
34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 461 [Roach & Trebilcock Article] at 488; see also the “Interim Report
on the Competition Act” (Report of the Standing Committee on Industry, June 2000) at
Chapter Six, online: (2000) <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/362/indu/
reports/rp1031742/indu01/13-ch6-e.html>,
61 “Study of the Historical Cost of Proceedings Before the Competition Tribunal”, Report
Prepared for the Competition Bureau, online: (1999) <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/ct/
wiserep-e.pdf> [Cost Study].
62 Indeed, the potential for frivolous litigation is quite substantial. One study reported that
between 1992 and 2000, only 1% of reviewable complaints were found by the Bureau to be
meritorious of action on their part, suggesting that there may be a large pool of unsatisfied
complainants. See Rowley & Campbell, supra note 8 at 56.
63 Roach & Trebilcock Article, supra note 60 at 488-89; this final concern is less of an issue
in Canadian competition law since the Commissioner has a right under section 103.2 to
intervene in a private application.
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in line with public aims, i.e., encouraging parties to bring meritorious
litigation and dissuading parties from bringing frivolous or strategic
litigation.
It is important to note that this conception of private party access
is one in which private party access is instrumentally effective as a
mechanism for fostering competition. Contrary to what Trebilcock
and Roach suggest,64 allowing this type of private party access to the
Tribunal should not be—and has not been, as evidenced by Rothstein
JA’s comment cited above—justified on grounds of corrective justice.
Corrective justice would require the vindication of an applicant’s
rights where they have been infringed or violated.65 However, as noted
above, the general conception of competition law is that it protects
competition rather than competitors; a corrective-justice framework of
private access would necessarily imply that a primary goal is protecting
competitors. Moreover, it seems difficult to argue that any type of private
right belonging to competitors is explicitly protected by competition
law. This is because the Competition Act only prohibits actions when
they have an anti-competitive effect and not simply when a business
is harmed. For example, a refusal to deal which ruins a business only
runs afoul of section 75 if it has an “adverse effect” on competition.66
However, whether there has been an adverse effect on competition or
not, the business itself has been affected in the exact same manner by
the refusal to deal. If corrective justice was a legitimate rationale, the
law would protect the business whether or not the practice caused an
adverse effect on competition, while the law in fact only prohibits the
practice if it results in reduced competition. Thus, although certain types
of private actions not considered here, such as those permitting recovery
by consumers under section 36, might be justified in part by theories of
corrective justice, it is important to bear in mind that the private party
access to the Tribunal considered by this article is justified by the social
benefit such access brings in terms of protecting competition. With this
64 Roach & Trebilcock Article, Ibid. at 488.
65 For a general overview of corrective justice, see E.J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
66 Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 75.
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in mind, the following sections examine the extent to which the current
framework of private party access appropriately structures the incentives
of private parties to bring them in line with the public goal of fostering
competition.

A. Obtaining Leave to Make an Application
As discussed above, section 103.1(7) requires an applicant seeking leave
to establish 1) that his business is directly and substantially affected by
the practice, and 2) that the alleged practice could be subject to an order
under sections 75 or 77. While much of the current mechanism for
bringing an application is appropriate from a policy standpoint, the policy
considerations discussed above would justify a different standard for the
first requirement, i.e., the standing test.
Both a) the requirement to seek leave to make an application, and b)
the requirement to give some evidence in support of each statutory
element of a reviewable practice are reasonable from a policy standpoint.
There are a number of reasons for this. First, an initial application stage
provides an opportunity for frivolous or vexatious claims to be dismissed
without exposing the respondent to long and costly litigation.67 Second,
it provides an opportunity for novel legal claims to be tested at lower cost
to the applicants, thereby actually increasing the possibility of a genuinely
meritorious, though novel, claim being brought. Third, by providing a
low-cost forum for the adjudication of novel claims, the jurisprudence on
the legal meaning of certain statutory provisions can be expanded relatively
easily. Indeed, the applications brought under section 103.1 have provided
at least some additional definition to certain provisions.68 This clarity is
67 This goal has been successfully accomplished by the current provisions. While the
merits of many of the cases are debatable, at the very least it seems clear that the applicant
in National Capital News would have failed in an application under section 75. See National
Capital News, supra note 18. A seemingly frivolous claim was also dismissed in Annable,
supra note 40
68 At the very least, the applications under section 103.1(1) have helped define some of the
outer contours of the requirements of section 75. Perhaps the best example of this is that
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especially important in Canadian competition law, where few cases have
been litigated and the contours of many statutory provisions are unclear.
By contrast, the current test for standing—which requires that the
applicant’s business be directly and substantially affected—is overly
onerous. On the one hand, it does make sense to have some type of
standing requirement. It is desirable that the applicant actually has some
genuine interest in the outcome of the application in order to ensure that
the applicant has an incentive to properly litigate what could be, if the
application for leave is allowed, a long and costly process. On the other
hand, there should not be an overly arduous threshold for standing which
arbitrarily bars genuinely interested applicants who have a sufficient
incentive to properly litigate a claim.69
The particularly problematic aspect of this requirement from a policy
perspective is the notion that what is “substantial” is to be assessed in the
context of the entire business. There are two problems with this. First, as
noted above, in terms of the rationale for having a standing requirement
in order simply to give standing to applicants who will take proper steps
to effectively litigate the application, there seems to be no justification
for denying standing to applicants whose companies have only had one
product line of their business impacted; this is particularly the case if the
degree to which the firm has been affected is still relatively substantial in
absolute terms, even if it is not substantial in proportion to the total size of
the business.
Second, and more importantly, it should be remembered that the purpose
of competition law is to protect competition rather than competitors.
From the perspective of protecting competition, the assessment for impact
should be with respect to the product in question rather than the firm. To
give a concrete example, whether Givenchy refuses to supply its perfumes
the meaning of “substantially affected” in section 75(1)(a) has been given some additional
precision by certain decisions, e.g., Broadview, supra note 25; Paradise, supra note 40.
69 Perhaps the most obvious example of this is in Sears, supra note 27. Given that they
stood to lose about $16 million, it seems surprising to suggest that they did not have a
sufficient interest to bring an application.
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to Sears or to a small retailer which exclusively sells Givenchy perfume,
the anti-competitive effect is equivalent, as the competition in the sale of
Givenchy’s perfume has been reduced.70 If the purpose of competition law
is to protect competition rather than competitors, then it seems arbitrary
that the small retailer should be given standing but Sears should not.71 The
focus should be on the anti-competitive effects on the particular product
market rather than on the producer or retailer of that product.
Given the policy considerations listed above, it seems that a better
requirement for standing would be a provision that requires that the
business be “directly and materially” affected rather than “directly and
substantially” affected.72 The former term would still ensure that the
applicant has a sufficient interest to effectively litigate the action, but it
70 While a discussion of the anti-competitive effects of vertical restraints are outside
the scope of this paper, for an overview of the economics of vertical restraints, see Doris
Hildebrand, Economic Analyses of Vertical Agreements – A Self-Assessment (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 2005) at 11-23 [Hildebrand].
71 On a related point, this also suggests that the tribunal looking to section 75.(1)(a) in
order to inform the meaning of “substantial” in section 103.1(7) may have been somewhat
misguided. In the context of section 75(1)(a), the requirement of the business being
“substantially affected” was a substantive statutory element of the reviewable practice, since,
as Trebilcock et al. write, the history of this provision was that it was, atypically in the
Competition Act, one that was—but no longer following the introduction of section 75(1)(e)
in 2002—concerned with the protection of downstream businesses rather than protecting
competition per se. See Trebilcock et al., supra note 2 at 420-21. By contrast, “substantially
affected” in section 103.1(7) is not a substantive element of the reviewable practice but
rather a provision which limits standing. Thus, the purpose of the term is different in the
two sections, and the Tribunal should have considered this when interpreting “substantially
affected” in the statutory context of section 103.1(7).
72 This point may appear somewhat academic, since applicants under section 75 would
still have to establish that they were substantially affected under the second element of
the section 103.1(7) test. However, an overly onerous standing requirement should not
restrict the availability of standing to bring a section 77 application. Moreover, the second
argument above also speaks to a modification of the meaning of “substantial” in section
75(1)(a), so there may be reasons to change the wording in both sections. Note also that
“materially” is the term favoured by Roach and Trebilcock, though they too would not
have included the directness requirement. See Roach & Trebilcock Article, supra note 60.
By contrast, the standing requirement which would be introduced by Bill C-10 for private
applications challenging price maintenance is, as noted above in footnote , that a person
be “directly affected.” The absence of the requirement that the person be “substantially”
affected suggests an even lower threshold for standing than the “directly and materially”
standard suggested here.
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would not preclude a large firm from bringing an application merely
because the effect on its business was relatively small. While this might
seem to expand the number of successful applications—especially
given the number of applicants that failed to clear the hurdle of being
substantially affected—it should be remembered that applicants would still
have to establish the elements of underlying reviewable practice including
some type of harm to competition.73 Many of the frivolous applicants
which were dismissed by the Tribunal for want of a substantial effect on the
applicant’s business would still likely be dismissed for lack of an adverse
effect on competition. The only difference is that meritorious applicants
that could show an adverse effect on competition would not be prevented
from accessing the Tribunal merely because their businesses were not
completely annihilated.

B. Remedies
As examined above, while the current statutory framework allows parties
to seek both interlocutory and permanent injunctive relief, it does not
allow parties to recover damages. This section will consider whether there
are policy arguments for allowing private parties to recover damages, as
some have argued.74 It will conclude that although there may be some
benefits in terms of deterrence from allowing parties to recover damages,
there are stronger arguments to limit parties’ available remedies to
injunctive relief.
There are two potential ways in which allowing successful applicants to
recover damages could structure private incentives in line with the socially
desirable outcome. First, the potential for recovery of damages gives the
aggrieved applicant a greater incentive to bring an application before the
Tribunal. Second, the prospect of having to pay damages deters a potential
offender from engaging in the anti-competitive conduct in the first place.75
73 Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 103.1.
74 For example, see Trebilcock et al., supra note 2 at 82-89, 91.
75 Both these points are noted in a 2002 House of Commons Committee report on
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Although both of these arguments seem plausible, they are much weaker
upon closer inspection.
With respect to the first mechanism, it should first be noted that it is
not immediately clear that an award of damages is actually necessary in
order to provide parties with a sufficient incentive to bring applications.
Between the introduction of section 103.1 in 2002 and December 2008, 17
applications were brought by private parties under section 103.1 alleging
reviewable practices under section 75. By contrast, since the introduction
of the Competition Act in 1986, only five applications have been brought
by the Bureau to the Tribunal under section 75. There has thus been a
significant increase in the number of applications. Second, while the
availability of damages awards might increase the number of meritorious
applications, it might also increase the incidence of those that are frivolous
or merely strategic. Furthermore, the potential for large damage awards
might deter sufficiently risk-averse corporations from defending frivolous
claims and instead compel them to settle. This could put excessive power
in the hands of unscrupulous applicants. Third, even if in some cases the
unavailability of damages provided no incentive for a party to bring an
application under section 103.1, they could still either make a complaint
to the Bureau about the practice in question or apply to the Commissioner
to begin an inquiry under section 9.76 The fact that private parties do not
necessarily have sufficient incentives to challenge every reviewable practice
does not mean that the private party mechanism is ineffective. Rather, it
merely highlights the fact that the Bureau and the existence of a private
right of access are not alternatives, but are instead complementary, with the
Bureau having a role in bringing certain applications which private parties
do not have sufficient incentives to bring.
competition law, which argued in favour of the availability of damages for successful
private litigants. Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, “A Plan to
Modernize	

     Canada’s	

     Competition	

     Regime”	

     (April	

     2002)	

     at	

     46-48	

     [Committee	

     Report].	

    
For theory and evidence on the deterrent effect of damages for violation of antitrust laws,
see Michael Block, Frederick Nold & Joseph Gregory Sidak, “The Deterrent Effect of
Antitrust	

    Enforcement”	

    (1981)	

    89	

    J.	

    Pol.’l	

    Econ
’y. 	

    429.	

    
76 Competition Act, supra note	

     2,	

     s.	

     9.	

     For	

     a	

     discussion	

     of	

     some	

     of	

     the	

     Commissioner’s	

    
duties under section 9, see Charette v. Canada (Commissioner of Competition), 2003 FCA
426, 2003] F.C.J. No. 1697.
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With respect to the second mechanism discussed above, although awarding
damages to successful applicants would likely deter corporations from
undertaking reviewable practices, there are two additional considerations
which speak against permitting damage awards. First, there is always
the possibility of over-deterrence. From a practical standpoint, it is
exceptionally difficult to set awards in such a way as to provide the optimal
level of deterrence.77 Moreover, the reviewable practices which can form
the basis of an application under section 103.1 can in many circumstances
have benign or pro-competitive effects. The possibility of high damage
awards might thus deter corporations from engaging in such conduct even
when it is not anti-competitive.78 Second, the possibility of significant cost
awards being granted to successful parties may already provide sufficient
deterrence against the most egregious practices. In B-Filer Inc. et al. v. The
Bank of Nova Scotia, the only application under section 103.1 which was
litigated to conclusion, the Tribunal awarded costs to the respondent of
almost $900,000.79 Because of the complexity of competition litigation, the
potential for large cost awards being made against the losing party is high.
Thus, at least some measure of anti-competitive conduct may already be
deterred without the need for significant damage awards.
These observations provide preliminary support for the conclusion that
damages should not be available to successful litigants in private actions
under section 103.1. However, this paper should not be taken to endorse
the proposition that damages should not be awarded. The desirability
of damage awards is, using the framework developed above, a question
of striking the optimal balance between the benefit of deterring anticompetitive conduct and the harm of frivolous or strategic litigation. While
the discussion above suggests that, at the moment, the appropriate balance
is already being achieved without the availability of damage awards, a
comprehensive assessment of this issue requires significant empirical
77 	

     For	

     a	

     discussion	

     of	

     various	

     theories	

     of	

     optimal	

     deterrence	

     and	

     the	

     difﬁculties	

     in	

    
assessing that optimal level, see William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, “Private Antitrust
Enforcement: The New Learning” (1985) 28 J.L. & Econ. 405 at 407-413.
78 For a discussion of some of the benign or even efficiency-enhancing effects of reviewable
practices, see Hildebrand, supra note 70 at 16-18; see also Trebilcock et al., supra note 2 at
424, 468-73.
79 B-Filer Inc. et al. v. The Bank of Nova Scotia, 2007 Comp. Trib. 29.
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work that is beyond the scope of this paper. It is sufficient for the moment
to remark that damage awards should not be made available without the
existence of evidence which contradicts the observations and arguments
developed above, and any move to introduce damage awards should thus
be based on a demonstrable rather than a hypothesized need to deter anticompetitive conduct.
As a final point on this issue, in accordance with the framework developed
above, this paper now notes one argument that should not be taken to
support the availability of damages for successful litigants. In addition
to the instrumental deterrence-based rationales examined above, some
have argued in favour of the availability of damages in such actions on
somewhat correctivist grounds, suggesting that parties have a right to be
compensated for harms suffered as a result of another’s anti-competitive
conduct.80 However, for the reasons examined above, this justification has
and ought to have limited application in the context of section 103.1, as
the purpose of this provision and the Competition Act generally relates to
the protection of competitive markets as an objective in and of itself, rather
than the protection or provision of any non-instrumental right to individual
competitors. Thus, any justification for awarding damages in actions under
section 103.1 should be based on instrumental considerations rather than on
the notion that competitors possess any inherent right not to be harmed by
anti-competitive conduct that section 103.1 allows them to vindicate.

C. The Substantive Scope of Private Access
The	

    ﬁnal	

    issue	

    which	

    this	

    paper	

    addresses	

    is	

    whether	

    it	

    is	

    appropriate	

    to	

    
expand the scope of private access to the Tribunal to allow private parties
to bring applications under sections other than sections 75 or 77, or, if Bill
80 For	

    example,	

    in	

    “A	

    Plan	

    to	

    Modernize	

    Canada’s	

    Competition	

    Regime,”	

    the	

    Standing
Committee on Industry, Science and Technology noted that “[t]he right to sue for damages
is a fundamental right accorded to plaintiffs in civil proceedings throughout the world. It is
an injustice that applicants in Tribunal proceedings should be denied the same fundamental
right as any other litigant to claim restitution for the losses they have sustained as a result
of	

    another	

    person’s	

    anticompetitive	

    conduct.”	

    Committee	

    Report,	

    supra note 75 at 47.
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C-10 becomes law, under an amended section 76. In questioning what
applications private parties should be permitted to bring, the fundamental
policy issue remains the same as above; the potential for more effective
enforcement of competition laws must be balanced against the potential
harm of strategic or frivolous litigation. Based on these considerations,
this paper argues that there is a strong case for allowing private parties to
bring applications under section 79.81
Section	

    79,	

    which	

    prohibits	

    abuse	

    of	

    a	

    party’s	

    dominant	

    position	

    in	

    the	

    
market, is a broad provision which can capture a wide cross-section of
anti-competitive acts.82 Section 79(1) states that:
(1) Where, on application by the Commissioner, the Tribunal
finds that
(a) one or more persons substantially or completely
control, throughout Canada or any area thereof, a class or
species of business,
(b) that person or those persons have engaged in or are
engaging in a practice of anti-competitive acts, and
(c) the practice has had, is having or is likely to have the
effect of preventing or lessening competition substantially
in a market,
the Tribunal may make an order prohibiting all or any of
those persons from engaging in that practice.83
81 This proposal is by no means unprecedented. A 2002 House of Commons committee
report recommended expanding the private right of access to include actions under section
79 of the Competition Act. Committee Report, supra note 75 at 50. In its response to this
proposal, the government indicated that it preferred to wait until the effect of private party
access under section 75 and section 77 could be assessed before making a decision as to
whether to expand it to section 79. See Government Response to the Report of the House of
Commons Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology “A Plan to Modernize
Canada’s Competition Regime” (October 2002) at 9.
82 For an overview of the law relating to abuse of dominance, see Trebilcock et al., supra
note 2 at Chapter 8.
83 Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 79.
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The breadth of this provision stems from the scope of the term “anticompetitive act,” which is defined in section 78(1) by reference to a nonexhaustive list of eleven examples of anti-competitive acts, and which was
held in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Nutrasweet Co. to
include any acts with an anti-competitive purpose.84
It seems likely that private applications under section 79 would provide
more effective enforcement of the Competition Act. As with all reviewable
practices, the private applicants may have better information about the
impugned practice than would the Bureau, as well as a greater incentive
to bring the application. Given the breadth of section 79, the fact that only
nine applications have been brought under its aegis by the Bureau since
1986 suggests that the Bureau may be overly conservative in enforcing
the provision.85 Indeed, the high success rate of the Bureau in section 79
applications suggests that they will only bring an application under section
79 if they are very likely to be successful.86 This suggests that there may be
a role for private parties to play in enforcing the provision in borderline
cases. Moreover, if private applicants were to appropriate some of the
Bureau’s role in enforcing section 79, this would provide the Bureau with
more resources to devote to effectively enforcing those areas of competition
law where private enforcement would be especially problematic, such as
in the merger review process. Finally, given the breadth of the statutory
provision and the scant judicial consideration it has received, there may be
significant benefits from increased litigation which can adequately define
the contours of these provisions.
By contrast, there are not significant concerns over the potential for a flood
of strategic or frivolous litigation if private applications can be brought
84 Ibid., s. 78; Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Nutrasweet Co. (1990), 32
C.P.R. (3d) 1 (Comp. Trib) [Nutrasweet].
85 Mark Katz, “Abuse of Dominance” in James Musgrove, ed., Fundamentals of Canadian
Competition Law (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007) 147 at 149.
86 The high cost of abuse of dominance applications may explain the limited number
of applications brought by the Bureau. One study estimated the costs to the Bureau of
investigating and prosecuting NutraSweet at $1,449,195 and Tele-Direct at $2,726,888; see
Cost Study, supra note 61 at 19. Nutrasweet, supra note 84; Canada (Director of Investigation
and Research) v. Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. (1997), 73 C.P.R. (3d) 1 (Comp. Trib.).
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under section 79. There are two reasons for this. First, the statutory terms
of section 79 provide an internal check on the number of potentially
meritorious suits which the Tribunal could allow. Section 79(1)(a) limits
the provision to situations where “one or more persons substantially or
completely control, throughout Canada or any area thereof, a class or
species of business.” The Tribunal has stated that there will not be a prima
facie finding of dominance if the respondent’s market share is lower
than 50%.87 This means that the class of businesses to which section 79
could potentially apply is much smaller than that to which sections 75
or 77 could apply. Moreover, the Federal Court of Appeal recently held
that section 79(1)(b) requires some aspect of an anti-competitive intent,
though subjective intent need not be demonstrated.88 Furthermore, the
court held that “proof of a valid business justification for the conduct
in question can overcome the deemed intention arising from the
actual or foreseeable effects of the conduct, by showing that such anticompetitive effects are not in fact the overriding purpose of the conduct
in question”.89 This can provide respondents with a strong defence to
an action under section 79. Finally, unlike section 75(1)(e) which only
requires an “adverse effect on competition”, section 79(1)(c) requires
the prevention or substantial lessening of the competition.90 Thus, this
overview of the statutory requirements of section 79(1) suggests that
the difficulties in establishing that a violation of section 79 occurred
may significantly dissuade private litigants from bringing unmeritorious
claims.
Second, the incentive to bring frivolous litigation is further dampened
by the high costs that losing applicants may have to bear. This effect may
be especially pronounced in abuse of dominance cases, where the factual
and legal issues can be more complex and the costs of litigating even
higher than in other types of competition actions.91 Thus, the difficulties
87 Canada (Director of Investigation & Research) v. Laidlaw Waste Systems Ltd., [1992]
C.C.T.D. No. 1, 40 C.P.R. (3d) 289, at para. 68.
88 Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Canada Pipe Co., 2006 FCA 233, 49 C.P.R.
(4th) 241, 268 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 350 N.R. 291, [2007] 2 F.C.R. 3.
89 Ibid., at para. 73.
90 Competition Act, supra note 2, ss. 75, 79.
91 See Cost Study, supra note 61 at 19.
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in establishing an offence, combined with the possibility of a high adverse
cost order, will likely provide a deterrent to the bringing of frivolous or
strategic actions under section 79.

IV. CONCLUSION

This paper has explored and critically assessed the current framework
of private access to the Competition Tribunal. First, it has provided a
systematic overview of some of the provisions governing private party
access to the Tribunal. This discussion suggests that while the case law
on private party access is slowly starting to flesh out the content of
section 103.1, there remain some ambiguities, particularly with respect
to what constitutes “sufficient credible evidence” to justify granting leave.
Applicants should have an understanding of exactly what is required of
them at the initial stage of seeking leave, and clarity from the Tribunal on
this point would be a welcome development.
Second, this paper has evaluated these provisions from a policy
perspective in order to determine whether the current regime is an
optimal one in furthering the goals and purposes of competition law in
Canada. This was based on a consideration of the degree to which the
current framework of private party access appropriately structures the
incentives of private parties to align them with the public goal of fostering
competition by providing incentives to bring meritorious litigation while
still deterring frivolous or strategic litigation. Based on this analysis,
two modest revisions to the Competition Act were proposed: lowering
the standing requirement for individuals from having their businesses be
“directly and substantially” affected to merely having their businesses be
“directly and materially” affected; and expanding section 103.1 to include
the possibility of bringing applications for reviewable practices falling
under section 79.
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While there are legitimate concerns that the expansion of a private right
of access to the Tribunal could result in an explosion of costly competition
litigation, the above analysis suggests that these concerns are limited
with respect to the changes proposed. While both the lowering of the
standing requirement and the expansion of private access to section 79
would increase the amount of litigation, frivolous and strategic litigation
would still be a) dismissed at the Tribunal stage, thereby minimizing
social costs, and b) deterred by the power of the Tribunal to award costs to
the successful party. Thus, the proposed revisions represent incremental
changes which would not open the floodgates to unmeritorious litigation,
but which would rationalize the structure of private party access to align it
with the underlying policies of permitting that access.

